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ARGUMENT

The petitioner herein alleges that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the
law in the following particulars:
POINT I
In the court's ruling the court stated, in footnote 2, after finding that the first set of
interrogatories was not answered in a timely manner, that the appellant could not complain about
that fact, since the appellant did not attempt to introduce the answers at trial. The court ignored
the undisputed fact, cited in the brief and argued at oral argument, that Judge Stirba had
previously ruled that the responses were timely. (See Appendix). As such, that ruling was the law
of the case and appellant could not properly seek to admit these answers at trial. The appellant
specifically appealed this portion of the case. According to Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the answers should have been deemed admitted. See In the Matter of Pendleton, 2000
Adv. Rpt. 77; Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 1985). Judge Stirba's ruling specifically
barred Plaintiff from introducing the answers at trial.
POINT II
The court did not address the issue of whether the trial court should have awarded
damages after the time of the breach of the settlement agreement which was entered into in 1992,
after the court found that the agreement was in fact never complied with. Appellant argued that
by opting to re-open the case, the appellant did not waive the right to pursue damages for the

breach, but could argue for such damages, as well as for additional damages under the remaining
causes of action. In stating its ruling the trial court specifically recognized that the Appellant had
suffered damages. The trial court made a finding that the settlement was not complied with and
that damages had been suffered, yet awarded no damages. This court did not address this specific
aspect of the case in its ruling.
POINT III
In ruling on the issue of sanctions, this court focused on only two of the examples of
delayed and deficient discovery, rather than on the entire history of the case. The Appellant
argued that the Appellee's conduct, taken as a whole, merited sanctions, citing the many
instances of motions to compel, the claimed destruction of their file and lack of any relevant
documents and other actions which resulted in the delay of the case for fourteen years. The
Appellant's argument was that the conduct of the Appellee prevented the Appellant from being
able to fairly try his case, and that the Appellee was therefore allowed to profit by its misdeeds.
Appellant argued on appeal that Judge Stirba erred in denying the motion for sanctions wherein
the entire pattern of conduct of the Respondent/Defendant was to delay and obstruct the
prosecution of the lawsuit by the Plaintiff/Appellant.

The overall conduct of the

Respondent/Defendant was more egregious and damaging to the ability of the Plaintiff to
proceed fairly than, for instance, the facts in Morton v. Continental Baking, 938 P.2d 271 (Utah
1997).
There are numerous examples where the Respondent claimed to be unable to provide
documents, as they had admittedly destroyed these documents, knowing full well that the lawsuit
was ongoing, and yet at trial, documents were produced or information subsequently surfaced.
This behavior and conduct spanned years and in spite of the occurrence of this conduct over
twelve years and yet Judge Stirba refused to impose sanctions. Had the court reviewed the entire
file and the many motions which had to be filed to compel discovery, the deficient responses and
the many instances wherein the Respondent claimed to have no information or documents to
provide, and compared that with the evidence that they submitted at trial, it would be apparent

that the entire conduct of the Respondent was to delay and obstruct the lawsuit, preventing the
Appellant from being able, in a fair manner, to prove his case. This court did not adequately
review the record and transcript and analyze it and the failure of Judge Stirba to impose sanctions
or to otherwise act to protect the interests of the Plaintiff, as well as the interests of fair justice in
this case.
POINT IV
This court, in analyzing the issue of the trial court's finding of a lack of malice,
improperly interpreted the definition of legal malice and the facts adduced at trial. In this court's
decision the court, while noting the standard of review was whether the trial court's findings
were clearly erroneous, proceeded to cite the facts in support of the trial court's findings as if the
legal standard was actual malice. The argument at trial, and on appeal, was that the actions of the
Respondent, taken as a whole, clearly established legal, or imputed malice. In that regard the
evidence was undisputed that the Appellant notified the Respondent by certified mail that the
vehicle was being returned because it was defective. Malice should have been imputed by the
evidence that the Respondent totally ignored any notices or phone calls, failed to respond in any
way, and obstructed and delayed the lawsuit, including failing to even attempt to comply with the
settlement agreement it signed in 1992. Neither this court or the trial court should impose the
burden on the Appellant to prove actual malice, that is that someone within the Respondent's
company harbored ill will toward the Appellant. The evidence presented should be analyzed
against the standard of legal or imputed malice, that is that the actions, or inactions and
indifference toward the Appellant's continued complaints, both before and after the lawsuit was
filed, together with their violation of the settlement agreement could not be explained any other
way than legal malice.
The Respondent, under the circumstances, did not have to report the matter as it did. And
it was undisputed that the Respondent knew that reporting the matter as a repossession was the
most damaging way the transaction could be reported. And it did so knowing that this was in

reality, a product dispute. Their failure to correct the matter, after being put on notice, as well as
the matters stated above establishes legal malice and the court's findings were clearly erroneous.
Wherefore, appellant requests that he be granted a rehearing on these matters.
Counsel further certifies that this petition is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
DATED this

day of

,2002.
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APPENDIX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 890906110CV
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA

HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER CREDIT
CORPORATION,

Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
May 19, 2000

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Specifically, on March 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a "Motion for
Sanctions and to Enter Default." On March 30, 2000, defendant,
Chrysler Financial Company, as a successor-in-interest to Chrysler
Credit Corporation, filed their "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Sanctions and to Enter Default." On April 12, 2000, plaintiff
filed its "Reply Regarding Motion for Sanctions and to Enter
Default." The matter was submitted for decision on April 13, 2000.
Neither party requested oral argument.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda and for the
good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling.
With this motion, plaintiff seeks an order of this Court
deeming admitted plaintiff's requests for admission, striking
Chrysler Financial's Answer and entering default against Chrysler
Financial. Plaintiff bases this request upon what he alleges is
Chrysler Financial's continual failure to respond to discovery.
Chrysler Financial opposes the motion arguing it has timely
responded to the orders of this Court, as well as subsequent
discovery requests served by plaintiff.
Accordingly, Chrysler
Financial has done nothing to warrant sanctions or an entry of
default.
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This action was filed in 1989. In 1992, the parties entered
into a settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, the
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice in 1992. In 1997, plaintiff
filed a motion to reopen the case, which was granted by this Court.
On September 27, 1999, this Court entered a Minute Entry
directing defendants to respond to plaintiff's previously filed
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests
for Admission, on or before October 8, 1999.
According to the
record, Chrysler Financial's response was dated and served October
8, 1999.
On November 8, 1999, plaintiff filed a Second Motion to
Compel, asserting Chrysler Financial's October 8 response was not
complete.
Chrysler Financial opposed the morion by memorandum
dated November 18, 1999, and supported by the Affidavit of Garry R.
Howe. This motion was never submitted for decision and during this
time, plaintiff's attorney withdrew from the case.
On January, 27, 2000, plaintiff served defendant, by mail, a
second set of Requests for Admission.
Defendant served its
response on February 28, 2000.
Based upon the forgoing, it appears Chrysler Financial
complied with the Court's Order to respond to previously filed
discovery by October 8, 1999. Moreover, Chrysler Financial timely
responded to plaintiff's second motion to compel1 and plaintiff's
January Requests for Admission.
Although plaintiff contends
Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories are unresponsive, he does
not specifically identify which answers are unresponsive or why he
believes they are lacking. Finally, although Chrysler Financial
admits not producing many documents in response to plaintiff s
recent discovery request, according to the uncontorverted affidavit
of Gary R. Howe, everything Chrysler Financial has to produce has
been produced.
Based upon the forgoing, there is no conduct on the part of
Chrysler Financial that would warrant the granting of sanctions or
the entry of default against Chrysler Financial.
Accordingly,
plaintiff's motion is respectfully, denied.

x

As noted, this motion was never submitted for decision.
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day of May, 2000.
BY THE COURT

ANNE M.J'STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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